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I.  Introduction 
 
Sometime during 1994 a trust was created with a certain Mr. Badenhorst, 
a successful farmer near a small South African town, as one of its tr ustees. At 
the time he was happily married. The marriage between Mr. Badenhorst 
and his wife was out of community of property, meaning that each one of 
the parties to the marriage had an own separate estate (or “patrimony”). The 
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of Reference,  The  Best  Solution for Europe?:  Cambridge L. J  70 (2011) 327–352 ; Edwin 
Cameron/Marius  J.  de Waal/Basil  Wunsh/Peter  Solomon/Ellison  Kahn, Honoré’s  South African 
Law of Trusts5  (2002 ); Alastair Hudson, Equit y and Trusts6  (2010 ). 
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 reason for the establishment of the trust, as he explained it to his wife, was 
to protect them against their creditors and to avoid inheritance tax. In the 
course of time, many of the assets acquired by Mr. Badenhorst in his private 
capacity were transferred to the trust. 
Unfortunately, the marriage did not last. Divorce proceedings were 
commenced and eventually a court granted a divorce order. One  of the 
questions  at the divorce proceedings  – and the only one relevant for this 
contribution – concerned the assets which could be taken into account for 
the purposes of a redistribution of assets between the parties under s. 7(3) of 
the Divorce Act 70 of 1979. Mr. Badenhorst’s  wife argued that the trust 
assets should be included in this redistribution exercise. He strenuously 
opposed such a course of action. 
This may appear to be a simple question, but its answer has implications 
for the integrity of the trust  institution  itself and for the law of trusts  in 
general. In Badenhorst  v. Badenhorst,1   that I will discuss,  together with a 
number of related cases, in greater detail below,2  the Court gave an answer 
which meant that the trust in question was effectively ignored. Put differently, 
the Court “went behind the trust form” and did exactly what Mr. Badenhorst’s 
wife asked of it, namely take the trust assets into account for purposes of the 
redistribution of assets. 
This phenomenon of a court being willing to “go behind the trust form” 
is  relatively new in the context of South African  trust  law. It has  been 
described in other ways, for instance that a court can “disregard the veneer 
of the trust”; or “disregard the trust”; or treat the trust as the “alter ego” of 
one or more of the trustees; or even “pierce the veil of the trust”. Occasionally, 
and in my view incorrectly, the trust  in question  is also referred  to as  a 
“sham”.3  But, regardless of the language used, it remains a radical action for 
a court in the sense that it runs counter to one of the fundamental principles 
of the law of trusts. This principle, to which I will return in greater detail,4 
is that the trust estate (also referred to as the trust “patrimony” or trust 
“fund”) is distinct or separate from the private estate of the trustee. 
In this contribution I will discuss the phenomenon, with South African 
trust law as my point of departure. My focus will primarily be the following 
two questions: First, when will a court be willing to “go behind the trust 
form” and ignore the trust  for a particular purpose?  And, secondly,  what 
will be the consequences of such an action? 
However, the issue goes further than South African law. It is safe to say 
that there is, at the very least, a growing interest in the development of what 
 
 
1   Badenhorst v. Badenhorst 2006 (2) SA 255 (SCA). 
2   See infra III.2. 
3   See infra II. 
4   See infra III.1. 
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 one may perhaps call a “continental European trust law”.5  One can see this 
at the level of individual states,6  but also at the general European level, with 
the publication in 1999 of the Principles  of European Trust  Law,7  and in 
2009 of Book X of the Draft Common Frame of Reference (the DCFR); 8 
the latter of which has introduced a general model for a civil law trust.9 
South Africa has a developed trust law, with a trust institution the architecture 
of which is fully  compatible with civilian principles.  The South African 
experience with regard to the phenomenon described  here may therefore 
offer useful lessons to a (developing) continental European trust law. 
The English law trust always provides a rich source for comparison in the 
trust context.10  In this contribution, I will refer to English trust law in order 
to illustrate that the phenomenon at issue here should be distinguished from 
the so-called “sham” trust issue.11  I will argue that the “sham” trust issue is 
one that plays itself out in quite a different context, and that it is important 
from  both a theoretical and a practical perspective  to keep the two issues 
apart. In order to illustrate the importance of the distinction between these 
two issues, it will, in fact, be necessary to deal with the “sham” issue first. 
 
 
II.  The “sham” trust issue 
 
1.  General: “simulation” or “sham” in South African law 
 
There is a long line of South African cases in which the courts were 
confronted with the question whether the parties to an agreement had the 
intention  to enter into that agreement in the form alleged by them,  or 
 
 
5   This  says nothing new, but for some  references  see e.g. Braun  345; Eric  Dirix/Vincent 
Sagaert, Trusts in European Civil Law, On Building Bridges and Trojan Horses, in: Essays in 
Honour  of CG van der Merwe (2011) 275–292 (277); Michele  Graziadei/Ugo  Mattei/Lionel 
Smith, Commercial Trusts in European Private Law, The Interest and Scope of the Inquir y, in: 
Commercial Trusts  in European Private Law, ed. by Graziadei/Mattei/Smith  (2005) 3–10 ; 
David Hayton, The Developing European Dimension  of Trust  Law: King’s College L. J  10 
(1999) 48–70. 
6   See previous note. 
7   Principles  of European Trust  Law, ed. by David J.  Hayton/Sebastian  C. J. J.  Kortmann/ 
Hendrik L. E. Verhagen (1999). 
8   Principles,  Definitions  and Model Rules  of European Private Law: Draft Common 
Frame of Reference  (DCFR)  – Outline  edition, ed. by Christian  von  Bar/Eric  Clive/Hans 
Schulte-Nölke (2009). 
9   Previous note. The development of a European trust law as such is not the focus of this 
contribution, but I will use a few examples from that context in order to illustrate the 
importance of fundamental trust law principles for the problem at issue here: see infra III. 1. 
10   See in general Marius J. de Waal, The Core Elements of the Trust: Aspects of the English, 
Scottish and South African Trusts Compared: S. Afr  L. J  117 (2000) 548–571 (569–570). 
11   See infra II. 
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 whether they used  that particular agreement as  a disguise  for something 
quite different. I will not discuss these cases in any depth or, indeed, analyse 
the particular issue as such. My intention is rather to draw attention to the 
general “simulation” or “sham” issue, and to show that it constitutes an issue 
which is quite different from the one described above with reference to the 
Badenhorst case.12 
As a general illustration, it may be helpful to use one of the latest South 
African cases in which this issue arose – not only because it is in many ways 
a typical case, but also because it contains an overview of some of the other 
leading authorities on the point. This is the case of Commissioner for the South 
African  Revenue  Service  v. NWK  Ltd.13  and it concerned a tax matter. The 
facts were quite complicated, but for present purposes it is not necessary to 
relate them in any great detail. NWK (the respondent, a public company) 
claimed deductions  from  income tax in respect  of interest  paid on a loan 
made to it by another company. These deductions were allowed. However, 
in 2003 the Commissioner  for the South African Revenue  Service (the 
appellant) issued new assessments which disallowed  these  deductions  and 
imposed additional tax. NWK appealed to the Tax Court against the revised 
assessments  and its  appeal was  upheld. The  case  under  discussion  is  the 
Commissioner’s appeal to the Supreme Court  of Appeal14  against this 
decision of the Tax Court. 
On appeal, the Commissioner argued that the loan in question was 
“simulated”, in that it had to be viewed in the light of a series of agreements 
which were “devised to increase the ostensible amount lent, so that 
deductions  of interest  on a greater amount could be claimed”.15  In other 
words, the intention was to gain a tax advantage rather than really to borrow 
the sum of money in question.16  NWK, on the other hand, argued that there 
was an “honest intention” to execute the agreements “in accordance with 
their tenor” and that the claims for deductions were therefore valid.17 
The Supreme Court of Appeal’s point of departure was that the “mere 
production of agreements does not prove that the parties genuinely intended 
them to have the effect they appear to have”.18 The question is rather whether 
the parties to an agreement actually intended that the agreement would have 
effect inter  partes “according to its tenor” (or form); if not, effect must  be 
 
 
 
12   See supra I. 
13   Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v. NWK  Ltd. 2011 (2) SA 67 (SCA). 
14   South Africa’s highest court in non-constitutional matters. 
15   Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v. NWK  Ltd. (supra n. 13) para  3. 
16   See also Commissioner  for  the South  African  Revenue  Service  v. NWK  Ltd. (supra  n. 13) 
para  38. 
17   Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v. NWK  Ltd. (supra n. 13) para  3. 
18   Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v. NWK  Ltd. (supra n. 13) para  40. 
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 given to “what the transaction  really is”.19   But how can this  question  be 
answered? 
Here, the Court sought guidance from a number of leading cases on this 
issue that have been reported over the years. In these cases, the courts have 
invoked two  principles  which  appear to  be finely balanced, but  not  in 
conflict.20 One is that there is nothing wrong in arranging one’s affairs so as 
to avoid some or other liability or to gain some or other advantage.21 The 
other is that a court “will not be deceived by the form of a transaction: it will 
rend aside the veil in which the transaction is wrapped and examine its true 
nature and substance”.22  One of the classic formulations of these principles 
in South African law is that of Innes J. A. in the old case of Zandberg v. Van 
Zyl23  which, because it eloquently expresses some of the points I regard as 
important for this contribution, is worth quoting in full here:24 
 
“Now, as a general rule, the parties to a contract express themselves in language 
calculated without subterfuge or concealment to embody the agreement at which 
they have arrived. They intend the contract to be exactly what it purports; and 
the shape which it assumes  is what they meant it should have. Not infrequently, 
however (either to secure some advantage which otherwise the law would not 
give, or to escape some disability which otherwise the law would impose), the 
parties to a transaction endeavour to conceal its real character. They call it by a 
name, or give it a shape, intended not to express but to disguise its true nature. 
And when a Court is asked to decide any rights under such an agreement, it can 
only do so by giving effect to what the transaction really is; not what in form it 
purports to be.” 
 
According to the judge all of this can be summarised in the maxim plus 
valet quod agitur quam quod simulate concipitur:25  The challenge  is consequently 
to establish the “real intention” of the parties, which differs from the 
“simulated intention”.26   In each case this is a question of fact, the correct 
answer to which cannot be based on any general rule.27 
 
 
 
19   Erf 3183/1 Ladysmith (Pty.) Ltd. v. Commissioner for Inland  Revenue 1996 (3) SA 942 (A) 
(953A-F) to which the Court (supra n. 13) refers in para  40. 
20   See Commissioner  for   the  South  African  Revenue  Service  v.  NWK   Ltd.  (supra  n. 13) 
para  42. 
21   Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v. NWK  Ltd. (supra n. 13) para  42. 
22   Wessels A. C. J  in Kilburn v. Estate Kilburn 1931 AD 501 (507), as cited by Hefer J. A. in 
Erf 3183/1 Ladysmith (Pty.) Ltd. v. Commissioner for Inland  Revenue (supra n. 19) 951C-D: see 
para  42. 
23   Zandberg v. Van Zyl 1910 AD 302. 
24   Zandberg v. Van Zyl (previous note) 309. 
25   “The real intention carries more weight than a fraudulent formulation (or pretence)”: 
Victor G. Hiemstra/Henri L. Gonin, Trilingual Legal Dictionar y3 (1992). 
26   Zandberg v. Van Zyl (supra n. 23) 309. 
27   Zandberg v. Van Zyl (supra n. 23) 309. 
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 However, this remains a very difficult challenge. In the NWK  case the 
Court pointed to a certain divergence in case law regarding the application 
of the two principles mentioned above, especially in that the cases “do not 
consistently approach what is really meant by a party’s intention in concluding 
a contract – what purpose he or she seeks to achieve”.28 This is probably  why 
the Court was unwilling to accept that the test to identify a “simulation” 
should simply be whether the parties had the intention to give effect to the 
agreement in accordance with its terms. In the Court’s view, the test should 
go further  and require “an examination of the commercial sense of the 
transaction: of its real substance and purpose”.29  Therefore, the Court 
concluded, if the purpose of a contract is only to achieve an object which 
allows for the evasion of tax or of a peremptory law, it will be regarded as 
simulated.30   Also, the mere fact that the parties do perform in accordance 
with the contract is not an indication that it is not a simulation – the “charade” 
of performance may only be meant to give “credence” to the simulation.31 
In the context of the facts of the NWK  case, the central question for the 
Court was therefore what the “real purpose” of the loan was – whether it 
had commercial substance or made business sense.32  In other words, did the 
loan have any purpose or commercial sense other than creating a tax 
advantage to  NWK?33    In  answering  this  question  the  Court  identified 
several “inexplicable  aspects”34  regarding the series of contracts between the 
parties.35  It also analysed other contracts concluded between the parties 
pursuant to the loan contract;36  the motive for any possible deception;37  and 
the credibility of one of the key witnesses for NWK.38   Based on all these 
factors,  the  Court’s  conclusion  was  that there  was  indeed no  “real and 
 
 
28   Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v. NWK  Ltd. (supra n. 13) para  45. In 
this regard the Court referred to diverging approaches followed in the following cases: 
Commissioner of Customs and Excise v. Randles, Brothers & Hudson Ltd. 1941 AD 369; Vasco Dry 
Cleaners v. Twycross 1979 (1) SA 603 (A); Skjelbreds Rederi A/S v. Hartless (Pty.) Ltd. 1982 (2) 
SA 710 (A); Hippo Quarries (Tvl.) (Pty.) (Ltd.) v. Eardley 1992 (1) SA 867 (A) and Commissioner 
for Inland  Revenue v. Conhage (Pty.) Ltd. (Formerly Tycon [Pty.] Ltd.) 1999 (4) SA 1149 (SCA). 
29   Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v. NWK  Ltd. (supra n. 13) para  55. 
30   Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v. NWK  Ltd. (supra n. 13) para  55. 
31   Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v. NWK  Ltd. (supra n. 13) para  55. 
32   Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v. NWK  Ltd. (supra n. 13) para  57. 
33   Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v. NWK  Ltd. (supra n. 13) para  58. 
34   Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v. NWK  Ltd. (supra n. 13) para  58. 
35   Commissioner  for  the  South  African  Revenue  Service  v.  NWK   Ltd.  (supra  n. 13), see, 
especially, paras  59–72. 
36   Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v. NWK  Ltd. (supra n. 13) paras  73– 
78. 
 
80. 
 
83. 
 
37   Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v. NWK  Ltd. (supra n. 13) paras  79– 
 
38   Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v. NWK  Ltd. (supra n. 13) paras  81– 
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 sensible commercial  purpose” in the contract.39 It was “dressed up” (in other 
words, simulated) as an obligation to pay interest in order to obtain the right 
to claim a tax deduction.40   The Commissioner’s  appeal was consequently 
successful. 
 
 
2.  What is a “sham” trust? 
 
Against this background a more pertinent question now arises: what is a 
sham  trust?  Surprisingly  little has been said on this  particular question  in 
South African law41 and, because of the specific focus of this contribution, it 
is not necessary to deal with it in any great detail. In the light of the general 
discussion of the simulation or sham issue above, it is in any event not too 
difficult to venture an answer. But first it is important to determine the 
correct context within which the question should be asked. In my view the 
question  whether or not a trust  is a sham  has everything to do with the 
requirements  for the creation of a valid trust.  In South African law these 
requirements  are now firmly settled  and they are the following:42  (1) the 
founder (also referred  to as the “settlor”  [in English  law] or “truster”  [in 
Scots law and the DCFR]) must intend to create a trust; (2) the founder’s 
intention must be expressed in a mode appropriate to create an obligation 
(such as a valid contract or will); (3) the trust property must be defined with 
reasonable certainty; (4) the trust object (which can be either personal or 
impersonal)  must  be defined with reasonable  certainty; and (5) the trust 
object must  be lawful.  If one or more of these  requirements  are not met, 
then no trust is established. 
Particularly relevant for present purposes is  the first  requirement 
mentioned: the founder must  have the intention to create a trust.43   If this 
intention is lacking,  or the real intention is to create something different, no 
trust  comes  into existence.  It is exactly here where jurisprudence  on the 
simulation or sham issue becomes relevant. In the language of Zandberg, one 
has to establish whether the founder intended the trust to be exactly what it 
 
39   Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v. NWK  Ltd. (supra n. 13) para  86. 
40   Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v. NWK  Ltd. (supra n. 13) para  87. 
41   But see  Rowan  Bell Stafford,  A Legal-Comparative Study of  the  Interpretation and 
Application of the Doctrines of the Sham and the Alter-Ego in the Context of South African 
Trust  Law, The Dangers  of Translocating  Company Law Principles  into Trust  Law (2010) 
(LLM thesis, Rhodes University) where the issue is investigated from a somewhat different 
angle. 
42   See Cameron/De Waal/Wunsh/Solomon/Kahn 117. 
43   In South African law an inter vivos trust is created by contract and the intention to create 
a trust must consequently be shared by the founder and the prospective trustee: see Cameron/ 
De Waal/Wunsh/Solomon/Kahn 119. However, unless the context requires otherwise, the 
emphasis here will only be on the intention of the founder. 
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 purports  to be; whether the shape  which it assumes  is what he meant it 
should have.44  Or has the founder given it the name or shape of a trust, not 
with the intention to express its true nature, but to disguise it?45  In the South 
African context it is possible, for example, that the founder did not intend to 
create a trust, but rather a modus, a fideicommissum, an agency or a partnership.46 
It is also possible that there could have been no intention on the part of the 
founder to create any particular legal institution, but only to use the name 
or the shape  of the trust  institution  to gain some  or other advantage. In 
especially  the latter instance,  it may properly be said that the “trust”  in 
question is a sham – in the sense that no trust has come into existence. Then 
a court will – again in the language of Zandberg – give effect to what the 
“transaction” really is, not what in form it purports to be.47  In order to do 
this, the challenge will be to determine the “real intention” of the founder, 
as opposed to the “simulated intention”.48  As indicated, this will always be a 
question of fact, and the application of general rules will be of little 
assistance.49  Of course, the new test formulated in the NWK  case might be 
of assistance here – an examination, namely, of “the commercial  sense of the 
transaction: of its real substance and purpose”.50  However, it should be kept 
in mind that NWK  concerned a tax matter and that the test might be 
especially useful in that context. 
This brings us back to the Badenhorst case with which the discussion 
commenced.51    It  will be  recalled that  there  the  essential  question  was 
whether the Court could “go behind the trust  form” in that instance  (or 
“ignore the trust”) in order to determine the scope of Mr. Badenhorst’s 
assets for the purposes of a redistribution order in divorce proceedings. But 
before one can speak  of something  like “going behind the trust  form” or 
“ignoring the trust” for a particular purpose, it is, to my mind, clear that one 
must be satisfied that a valid trust has been created in the first place. In the 
light of this, the trust in Badenhorst was not a sham trust at all. If it were, the 
question  whether  the Court  could “go behind” the trust  or “ignore” it 
would obviously have been inappropriate and unnecessary. On the contrary, 
a perusal of that case shows that the Court’s premise throughout was that a 
valid trust did exist.52  Moreover, nowhere in the case did the Court use the 
 
44   See supra II. 1. the quotation from Zandberg v. Van Zyl (supra n. 23) 309. 
45   Zandberg v. Van Zyl (supra n. 23) 309. 
46   For a discussion  of the differences  between these  legal institutions  and a trust,  see 
Cameron/De Waal/Wunsh/Solomon/Kahn 32 ff. 
47   See supra II. 1. the quotation from Zandberg v. Van Zyl (supra n. 23) 309. 
48   See supra II. 1. 
49   Previous note. 
50   Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v. NWK  Ltd. (supra n. 13) para  55. 
51   See supra I. 
52   See e.g. the Court’s references to the creation of the trust in paras  1 and 4(d) as well as 
the references throughout the case to the “trust assets” or “assets of the trust”. 
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 term “sham” in its discussion of the trust. In her evidence in the earlier case 
(from which this one was an appeal) Ms. Badenhorst did suggest that the 
trust  was a “sham”.53   However, the Court’s  ultimate finding in that case 
effectively entailed a rejection of this suggestion.54  Indeed, as I will illustrate 
in my discussion of this and other related cases,55  sham terminology was – 
rightly in my view – never used  in this  particular context. However, the 
same  cannot  be  said  about  all academic commentary on  the  case.  For 
example, in an article titled “Sham Trusts”,  Joffe analyses Badenhorst  and 
concludes that the Court found that the trust in question “was a sham”.56  I 
suggest that this amounts to an unfortunate distortion of the real issue in that 
case. Its classification  as a sham issue is not only theoretically unsound, but 
could also lead to the posing of the wrong questions, and the consequent 
proposal of the wrong solutions.57 
 
 
3.  “Sham” trusts in English law 
 
Compared with South African law, English law possesses a much richer 
judicial and academic literature on the sham issue – also in the context of 
trust law. An extensive analysis of this literature is neither possible nor 
necessary here. However, in it one does find support for the approach to the 
sham trust issue proposed in the South African context above. 
First, it appears that English and South African law share an understanding 
of the basic sham idea. For English law, Hudson defines a sham as “a scheme 
of action or a pattern of documentation which seeks to create the impression 
that the state of affairs is one thing when in fact it is something else”.58  For 
this definition, he draws on one of the leading English cases on the issue, 
namely Snook v. London and West Riding Investments Ltd.59  In Snook, Diplock 
L. J. held that a sham constitutes “acts done or documents executed by the 
parties to the ‘sham’ which are intended by them to give to third parties or 
to the court the appearance of creating between the parties legal rights and 
obligations  different from  the actual legal rights  and obligations  (if  any) 
which the parties intend to create”.60 Conaglen points out that this statement 
has indeed acquired “canonical” status, having been cited and adopted as an 
authoritative statement of the sham doctrine in common law jurisdictions 
 
 
53   See Badenhorst v. Badenhorst (supra n. 1) para  23. 
54   See Badenhorst v. Badenhorst (supra n. 1) e.g. para  28. 
55   See infra III. 
56   Harry Joffe, ‘Sham’ Trusts: De Rebus ( Januar y/Februar y 2007) 25–26 (26). 
57   See infra IV. 
58   Hudson 956. See also Philip H. Pettit, Equity and the Law of Trusts11  (2009) 239–240. 
59   Snook v. London and West Riding Investments Ltd. [1967] 2 QB 786. 
60   Snook v. London and West Riding Investments Ltd. (previous note) 802. 
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 around the world.61  The analogy with the South African position as set out 
above62 is also obvious. 
Secondly, in English books on the law of trusts, the issue of sham trusts is 
consistently dealt with in the context of the requirements for the creation of 
a valid express63  trust.64  English law requires three forms of certainty for this 
act of creation: (1) certainty of intention; (2) certainty of subject matter (that 
is, regarding the subject matter of the trust fund); and (3) certainty of object 
(that is, regarding who the beneficiaries are).65 As is the case in South African 
law,66  the first requirement is the decisive one for the issue of sham trusts.67 
If the founder’s intention68   is not to create a trust, but something else, no 
trust  will come into existence.69   Alternatively, the founder may wish  to 
create the impression  that a trust  has been created in order to use  it as a 
device to achieve a particular purpose – such as to deceive potential creditors. 
The latter scenario would be one in which the trust may properly be referred 
to as just a sham or a “pretence”70  and, once again, no trust will come into 
existence.71 Here, according to Moffat, there will be no certainty of intention, 
but rather a “sham intention”.72 
 
 
 
61   Matthew Conaglen, Sham Trusts: Cambridge L. J  67 (2008) 176–207 (177). 
62   See supra II. 1. 
63   The term “express” trust is used here to distinguish trusts created by an act of the parties 
from trusts arising by operation of law, such as constructive and resulting trusts. The latter 
types of trust fall outside the scope of this discussion. 
64   See e.g. Hudson 77 ff ; John Mowbray/Lynton Tucker/Nicholas le Poidevin/Edwin Simpson/ 
James  Brightwell,  Lewin on  Trusts18   (2008) 83 ff ;  Graham  Moffat  (with Gerry  Bean/Rebecca 
Probert),  Trusts  Law: Text and Materials5   (2009) 160 ff ; Graham  J.  Virgo/Edward  H.  Burn, 
Maudsley and Burn’s Trusts and Trustees: Cases and Materials7  (2008) 80 ff. 
65   Hudson 77. See also Mowbray/Tucker/Le Poidevin/Simpson/Brightwell 83 ff ; Moffat 121 ff.; 
Virgo/Burn 75 ff  (all previous note). 
66   See supra II. 2. 
67   However, the argument has been advanced that the sham doctrine should not be treated 
as merely a part of trust law’s principle regarding certainty of intention: see Conaglen (supra 
n. 61) 184–185. 
68   Note again (see also supra n. 43) that here I make reference only to the intention of the 
founder. But it has been argued convincingly in the context of the sham trust issue in English 
law that the sham intention must be shared by all the parties involved – in other words, that 
there must be a “commonality of intention”: see Conaglen (supra n. 61) 187–192. 
69   This happened in the case of Clough Mill v. Martin [1984] 3 All ER 982 where the court 
concluded that the intention was not to create a trust, but rather a “charge over property”: see 
Hudson 88–89. 
70   See Mowbray/Tucker/Le Poidevin/Simpson/Brightwell  92 and Virgo/Burn 80 (both supra 
n. 64) for the use  of this  term. The latter authors  (at 80) also speak  of the importance to 
determine whether there was an intention to create a “genuine trust”. 
71   This happened in the case of Midland Bank v. Wyatt [1995] 1 FLR 697 where the court 
concluded that the trust set up by Mr. Wyatt was a sham with the sole purpose of attempting 
to put property out of the reach of his creditors: see Hudson 90 and 488–489. 
72   Moffat (supra n. 64) 164. 
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 III.  The issue of “going behind the trust form” 
 
1.  Separation between trust assets and a trustee’s private assets 
 
A comparative  analysis of the civilian or mixed legal systems in which the 
trust has been received (and this is also true of South Africa, a prime example 
of a mixed legal system) clearly shows that the acceptance of the concept of 
two separate  estates (or patrimonies)  is absolutely  vital.73  This  means  that 
there is a separation between the assets which the trustee owns in his official 
capacity  as trustee (the “trust assets”) and the assets which the trustee owns 
in his private or personal capacity (the “private assets”). Put simply, there are 
two estates: a trust estate and a private estate. Apart from anything else, this 
concept of two estates explains  why civilian or mixed legal systems can 
accommodate the trust  without  also  having to accept the dichotomy in 
common law systems of “legal ownership” (of the trustee) and “beneficial 
(or equitable) ownership” of the trust beneficiary.74 
It is important to note that the concept of separate estates is also central to 
the structure of the trust as envisaged in the DCFR.75 There it is formulated 
as follows:76 
“A trust takes effect in accordance with the rules in Chapter 10 . . . with the effect 
that the trust  fund  is to be regarded as a patrimony distinct  from  the personal 
patrimony of the trustee and any other patrimonies vested in or managed by the 
trustee.” 
This  concept is also  confirmed explicitly in the Principles  of European 
Trust Law77 and the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and 
on their Recognition (1985),78 and it features strongly in many of the trust- 
like arrangements in continental Europe.79 
 
73   For a general overview of (and further references to) the trust in civilian and mixed 
jurisdictions, see De Waal (supra n. 10) 548–571; id., In Search of a Model for the Introduction 
of the Trust into a Civilian Context: Stellenbosch L. Rev. 12 (2001) 63–85; George L. Gretton, 
Trusts without Equity: Int. Comp. L. Q. 49 (2000) 599– 620 ; Kenneth G. C. Reid, National 
Report for Scotland, in: Principles of European Trust Law (supra n. 7) 67–84; id., Patrimony 
not Equity, The Trust in Scotland: European Review of Private Law (Eur. Rev. Priv. L.) 8 
(2000) 427–437; Hendrik L. E. Verhagen, Trusts in the Civil Law: Making Use of the Experience 
of “Mixed” Jurisdictions: ibid. 477–498. 
74   See in general and for further references Braun 345–346 and also the authorities quoted 
in the previous note. 
75   However, McFarlane adds the qualification that Book X does not “take as its starting 
point the idea that the trust depends on a trustee’s simultaneous holding of separate patrimonies” 
(my emphasis): see Ben McFarlane, An English Perspective, Two Cheers for Book X: Edinburgh 
L. Rev. 15 (2011) 471–474 (472). See also Braun 341 where she elaborates on this aspect. 
76   Art. X.-1:202(1). 
77   Art. 1(1). 
78   Art. 2 lit. a. 
79   See e.g. the examples from Belgian law provided by Dirix/Sagaert (supra n. 5) 279–282. 
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 In the civilian trust model, the trust beneficiary does not have a form of 
ownership (“beneficial [or equitable] ownership”) as does his common law 
counterpart – at most he has a personal right against the trustee.80  The 
concept of the separation of estates is therefore important, above all, for the 
protection of the trust beneficiary. This is also recognised and confirmed in 
the DCFR:81 
 
“In particular . . . the personal creditors of the trustee may not have recourse to 
the trust fund, whether by execution or by means of insolvency proceedings; 
the trust  fund  is not subject  to rules  allocating property rights  on the basis of 
matrimonial or family relationships; . . .” 
 
The implication is quite clear: trust  property cannot be “the object of 
rights of a creditor of the trustee or of his successors and cannot be subject 
to rules  allocating property rights  on the basis of matrimonial or family 
relationships”.82  In other words, the DCFR  makes provision for the “ring- 
fencing” of trust assets.83  The true function of the concept of separate estates 
(or a “segregated fund”) – in distinction with common law systems’ concept 
of a split ownership – is very well explained by Hayton: 84 
 
“However, there is no need for a modern trust law to perpetuate the historical 
distinction between the legal ownership of trustees and the equitable ownership 
of beneficiaries.  The  economic value vested  in beneficiaries  does  not require 
them to have equitable proprietary interests in the trust property, as evident, for 
example, in the case of Scots, Liechtenstein, Indian, South African, Japanese and 
Sri Lankan trusts. The crucial core of the trust concept is that the value of the 
beneficiaries’  interests  survives  the insolvency,  death or divorce of the trustee- 
owner-manager of the trust  property considered  as a segregated  fund  available 
only for the beneficiaries . . .” 
 
These authors also explain (at 290 –291) the significance of the principle in the context of the 
French fiducie, introduced in 2007. Regarding the latter, see also Jan Szemjonneck, Die fiducie 
im französischen Code civil: Zeitschrift für Europäisches Privatrecht (ZEuP) 18 (2010) 562– 
587 (576–577). Regarding Italian law, see Aldo Berlinguer, The Italian Road to Trusts: Eur. 
Rev. Priv. L. 15 (2007) 533–553 (who at 538 states that “the segregation of the property and 
rights  in the assets of the trustee  is contrar y to the general principle of the liability of the 
debtor”  in Art. 2740 of the Italian Civil Code); Alexandra  Braun,  An Italian Perspective: 
Edinburgh L. Rev. 15 (2011) 475–479 (pointing out at 478 that Italian courts have held that 
the segregation of trust assets in the context of the trust interno is indeed not in conflict with 
the unitar y concept of ownership in Art. 2740); and Maurizio Lupoi, Trusts, A Comparative 
Study (2000) 377–384. Writing with specific reference to Dutch law, also Van Erp has 
expressed the concern that, if Book X were to be followed on this issue, “the doctrine of unity 
of patrimony would be abandoned”: see Sjef van Erp, A Dutch Perspective: Edinburgh L. Rev. 
15 (2011) 479–482 (477–478). 
80   See in general the authorities referred to supra n. 73. 
81   Book X Art. 1:202(2). See also Art. 1 (3) of the Principles of European Trust Law. 
82   Dirix/Sagaert (supra n. 5) 287. See also Braun 333. 
83   Dirix/Sagaert (supra n. 5) 287. See also Braun 333. 
84   Hayton (supra n. 5) 51 (and also at 57, 65 and 68). 
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 The concept of two estates (or patrimonies) is therefore not only important 
from  a dogmatic or theoretical perspective,  but also from  a practical one. 
However, it is exactly  in the practical context where a danger lurks. This is 
that the founder of a trust can also be a trustee in that same trust and, 
especially, that the trustee can also be a beneficiary. In developed trust law 
systems this is so trite a statement of the law that no authority needs to be 
cited, but it is instructive to note that it is also specifically  acknowledged in 
both the DCFR85  and the Hague Convention.86  This notion of a trustee of 
a trust  also  being a beneficiary of that trust  – in combination with the 
possibility that the particular trustee may also be the founder – also provides 
an explanation for why things went awry in some of the South African cases 
discussed in the next section. Note, however, that the trustee also being the 
founder  and/or  a  beneficiary is  not  a  prerequisite  in  this  scenario.  In 
Badenhorst – to name but one example – the trustee (Mr. Badenhorst) was 
neither the founder nor a beneficiary of the trust. As I will illustrate,87  the 
conduct of the trustee in the administration of the trust lies at the heart of 
the matter. 
 
 
2.  The trust in practice: the possibility of breaching the separation 
 
As explained above,88  the issue which had to be decided in Badenhorst89 
was whether, when making a redistribution  order in terms  of the South 
African Divorce Act, the assets of an inter vivos discretionary trust created 
during the marriage of the parties could be taken into account.90 As indicated, 
the Court  decided that this  could indeed be done. Why did it reach this 
conclusion? 
As its point of departure, the Court confirmed the basic concept of a 
separation between the trust estate (or trust assets) and the trustee’s private 
estate (or private assets).91  However, the Court qualified this by stating that 
“the mere fact” of this  separation  did not “per se”  mean that trust  assets 
cannot be taken into account for the purposes of the redistribution order.92 
But before it can be included, there has to be evidence that the party in 
question “controlled the trust and but for the trust would have acquired and 
 
 
85   See Book X Art. 1:203(5). See also Braun 332. 
86   See Art. 2 which states that “the fact that the trustee  may himself  have rights  as  a 
beneficiar y, [is] not necessarily inconsistent with the existence of a trust”. 
87   See infra III. 3. 
88   See supra I. 
89   Badenhorst v. Badenhorst (supra n. 1). 
90   Badenhorst v. Badenhorst (supra n. 1) para  1. 
91   See Badenhorst v. Badenhorst (supra n. 1) para  9 and supra III. 1. 
92   Badenhorst v. Badenhorst (supra n. 1) para  9. 
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 owned the [trust] assets in his own name”.93  This control must be “de facto” 
and not necessarily “de iure”, as determined by taking into consideration 
both the terms of the particular trust deed and evidence of how the practical 
affairs of the trust were conducted during the marriage.94 
An analysis of both of these dimensions left the court with no doubt that 
Mr. Badenhorst did in fact control the trust assets. In terms of the trust deed, 
he was one of only two trustees (the other one was his brother); the trustees 
could determine the date of the vesting  of rights  in the beneficiaries;  he 
could discharge his co-trustee and appoint someone else in his place; he and 
his co-trustee had an unfettered discretion to do with trust assets and income 
as they saw fit; and he could be compensated for his duties as trustee, thereby 
ensuring an income stream for himself (should he wish to make use of it).95 
Regarding the running of the practical affairs  of the trust (or the 
administration of the trust), it transpired that Mr. Badenhorst seldom 
consulted or sought the approval of his co-trustee; he was in “full control” 
of the trust; and he paid “scant regard” to the difference between trust assets 
and his own assets (of which the Court gave several practical examples).96 
On this point the Court therefore concluded that, “but for the trust, 
ownership in all the assets would have vested in the respondent”.97   It was 
thus a “classic instance” of a case where the trustee had full control of the 
trust assets and in fact used the trust “as a vehicle for his business activities”.98 
This conclusion provided the basis on which the Court could order that the 
trust assets could be “added to” Mr. Badenhorst’s private assets for the 
purposes of the redistribution order.99 
Badenhorst was decided in the context of matrimonial property law. 
However, very much the same pattern has also played itself out also in other 
contexts  – notably in insolvency  and more general commercial ones.  A 
typical example of an insolvency case  is that of Nedbank Ltd. v. Thorpe.100 
This case concerned an application for an order provisionally sequestrating 
the estate of Mr. Thorpe (the respondent). The bank (the applicant) alleged 
that Mr. Thorpe had established various family trusts (of which he was both 
a trustee and a beneficiary), which he effectively used to “insulate his wealth 
from creditors and thereby to frustrate the efforts of his creditors to recover 
 
 
93   Badenhorst v. Badenhorst (supra n. 1) para  9. 
94   Badenhorst v. Badenhorst (supra n. 1) para  9. 
95   Badenhorst v. Badenhorst (supra n. 1) para  10. 
96   Badenhorst v. Badenhorst (supra n. 1) para  11. 
97   Badenhorst v. Badenhorst (supra n. 1) para  11. 
98   Badenhorst v. Badenhorst (supra n. 1) para  10. 
99   Badenhorst v. Badenhorst (supra n. 1) para  13. For other cases decided in the context of 
matrimonial property law see e.g. Jordaan v. Jordaan 2001 (3) SA 288 (C); Brunette v. Brunette 
2009 (5) SA 81 (SECLD). 
100    Nedbank Ltd. v. Thorpe [2008] JOL 22675 (N). 
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 debts owed to them”.101   The bank accordingly submitted that, if his estate 
were sequestrated, it would become possible to investigate his business affairs 
and to  locate trust  assets  that in reality belonged to  him in his  private 
capacity.102 Based on an analysis of the facts of the case, the Court concluded 
that there was indeed a “strong suspicion” that Mr. Thorpe was simply 
conducting his personal business through the trust.103 It consequently granted 
the provisional sequestration order. In the follow-up case, where the granting 
of a final sequestration order was considered, the issue of the true status of 
the trust and its assets was once again central.104  Here the Court conducted 
a more thorough investigation into the trust and its affairs, and it emphasised 
the following aspects regarding Mr. Thorpe’s relationship with the trust:105 
the trust deed provided that he could not be removed as trustee;106   it was 
“apparent” that he controlled the trust and access to the funds held by the 
trust;107  in a tax return his income was declared as “trustee remuneration”;108 
and the trust income allowed him to enjoy “an affluent lifestyle”.109  It was 
therefore probable that “the true and complete control of the trusts” vested 
in Mr. Thorpe.110  Moreover, there was enough evidence that he utilised the 
trusts to receive income generated by his various activities and to “insulate 
his wealth and assets” from his creditors.111  The Court thus clearly foresaw 
the possibility of going behind the trusts, with the result that trusts assets 
could eventually be used  to  satisfy  Mr.  Thorpe’s  private creditors.112    It 
consequently granted the final sequestration order. 
 
 
 
101    Nedbank Ltd. v. Thorpe (previous note) para  4. 
102    Nedbank Ltd. v. Thorpe (supra n. 100) para  5. 
103    Nedbank Ltd. v. Thorpe (supra n. 100) para  49. 
104    Nedbank Ltd. v. Thorpe [2009] ZAKZPHC 44 (unreported, accessible at <http://www. 
saflii.org/za/cases/ZAKZPHC/2009/44.html>). 
105    Note the focus, as in Badenhorst, on both the terms of the trust deed and the practical 
running of the affairs of the trust. 
106    Nedbank Ltd. v. Thorpe (supra n. 104) para  17. 
107    Nedbank Ltd. v. Thorpe (supra n. 104) para  18. 
108    Nedbank Ltd. v. Thorpe (supra n. 104) para  23. 
109    Nedbank Ltd. v. Thorpe (supra n. 104) para  24. 
110    Nedbank Ltd. v. Thorpe (supra n. 104) para  27. 
111    Nedbank Ltd. v. Thorpe (supra n. 104) para  27. 
112    Nedbank Ltd. v. Thorpe (supra n. 104) para  28. Such an order was in fact granted in the 
more recent case of First Rand Limited Trading as First National Bank v. Britz [2011] ZAGPPHC 
119  (unreported,  accessible  at  <http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPPHC/2011/119. 
html>). Here, the one trustee was the founder of the trusts in question and both he and his 
co-trustee were also beneficiaries of the trusts. In terms of the trust deeds they also had wide 
powers, e.g. to remove and appoint trustees and to deal with trust assets in their sole discretion. 
The Court also found that, in practice, these trustees possessed, utilised and derived the full 
benefit from the trust assets “on day-to-day basis” (see para  24). The Court thus came to the 
conclusion that the trusts were the “alter egos” of the trustees and that the trusts were not 
“actually separate” from them (see para  26). 
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 In the last category of cases which I want to refer to briefly, the respective 
courts did consider going behind the trusts in question. However, on the 
facts of the cases they eventually decided against such a step. In these cases 
the focus  rather fell on the way the trustees  conducted the affairs  of the 
trusts, with a particular emphasis on their non-compliance with the 
provisions of the trust deeds and their non-fulfilment of their fiduciary 
duties as trustees. The relevant cases are Land and Agricultural Bank  of South 
Africa v. Parker113  (undoubtedly the leading case regarding the topic of this 
contribution) and Van der Merwe NO and Others v. Hydraberg Hydraulics CC.114 
The facts of both cases are somewhat complicated, but it is not necessary to 
give a detailed exposition here. Suffice it to say that, in essence, both cases 
concerned the validity of legal acts performed  by the trustees of the respective 
trusts. In Parker (apart from loan agreements purporting to bind the trust) it 
was a petition for leave to appeal against an order sequestrating the trust, and 
in Van der Merwe a contract for the sale of land. In both cases it was held that 
these  acts were invalid because  the trustees  had acted in contravention of 
basic trust law principles (especially that trustees must act jointly) as well as 
central provisions of the respective trust deeds. This failure of the trustees 
takes on special significance in light of the fact that, in both cases, the trustees 
in question were also trust beneficiaries. In both cases the Courts were 
highly critical of the conduct of the trustees and considered going behind 
the trusts as a possible option. However, in neither of the cases did this 
actually happen: in Parker because a less drastic solution was available, and in 
Van der Merwe because the Court felt itself restrained by legislation pertaining 
to the sale of land. But this did not at all soften the distaste with which the 
conduct of the trustees  in both cases was regarded. In Van der  Merwe,  for 
example, Binns-Ward J. expressed it in the following terms:115 
 
“The facts of the current matter afford a classic example of an abuse of the trust 
form flowing directly from the conduct by Clarke and Bosman [two of the three 
trustees] in respect of the ownership of the fixed property, with no distinction 
between their responsibilities as trustees and their expectations as beneficiaries. 
They treat the property as their own, and invoke the existence of the trust only 
when it suits them.” 
 
This statement accurately encapsulates much of what has gone wrong in 
all the cases mentioned above: the breach of the separation between trust 
assets and private assets; no distinction being made between duties as trustee 
and expectations  as  beneficiary; and, in general, the “abuse”  of the trust 
institution. This idea of the “abuse” of the trust is an important one which I 
will explore in greater detail in the next section. 
 
113    Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v. Parker 2005 (2) SA 77 (SCA). 
114    Van der Merwe NO and Others v. Hydraberg Hydraulics CC 2010 (5) SA 555 (WCC). 
115    Van der Merwe NO and Others v. Hydraberg Hydraulics CC (previous note) para  39. 
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 3.  The explanation: the “abuse” of the trust 
 
After having identified cases in which the courts have shown their 
willingness  to go behind the trust,  the next challenge is  to explain the 
theoretical basis which could justify such  a course  of action. It has been 
argued that the sham trust concept116  does not provide such an explanation, 
and in my view, the cases discussed in the previous section confirm this. In 
all of them the courts’  premise  was that the trusts  in question  were valid 
trusts. Nowhere was the spectre of a sham trust raised, in the sense that no 
valid trust came into existence. 
The search for a theoretical explanation should, in my view, start at the 
very essence of trust theory itself – the so-called “trust idea”. In the leading 
South African case of Parker,117   Cameron J. A. (as he then was) formulated 
this basic idea in the following terms:118 
 
“The core idea of the trust is the separation of ownership (or control) from 
enjoyment. Though a trustee can also be a beneficiary, the central notion is that 
the person entrusted with control exercises it on behalf of and in the interests of 
another.” 
 
And again:119 
 
“The  essential notion of trust  law . . . is that enjoyment and control should  be 
functionally separate.” 
 
However, in a “newer type of trust”120  – especially certain business and 
family trusts, such as the ones encountered in the previous section – things 
are different. Here, the functional separation between control and enjoyment 
is entirely lacking,121 with the result that the core idea of the trust is 
“debased”.122  The trust form is employed not to separate beneficial interest 
from control, “but to permit everything to remain ‘as before’, though now 
on terms that privilege those who enjoy benefit as before while simultaneously 
continuing to exercise control”.123 
According to Cameron J. A. in Parker, it is evident that this “rupture of 
the control/enjoyment divide invites abuses”.124  In my view this concept of 
the “abuse”  of the trust  is central to the theoretical explanation of why a 
 
 
116    See supra II. 
117    Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v. Parker (supra n. 113) and see supra III. 2. 
118    Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v. Parker (supra n. 113) para  19. 
119    Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v. Parker (supra n. 113) para  22. 
120    Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v. Parker (supra n. 113) para  26, with reference 
to Nieuwoudt v. Vrystaat Mielies (Edms.) Bpk. 2004 (3) SA 486 (SCA) para  17. 
121    Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v. Parker (supra n. 113) para  25. 
122    Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v. Parker (supra n. 113) para  26. 
123    Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v. Parker (supra n. 113) para  26. 
124    Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v. Parker (supra n. 113) para  29. 
17
 court could under certain circumstances  – while still acknowledging the 
existence of the trust – go behind a trust and use the trust assets for purposes 
such as a redistribution order or the satisfaction of the trustee’s private 
creditors. In Parker it was stated explicitly that a court would “in appropriate 
cases” ensure that the trust form is not abused.125  It also set out a number of 
methods,  appropriate to each case, which could be employed in this  re- 
gard.126   The  important one for present  purposes  is  the suggestion  that it 
may, in a suitable case, be necessary to extend well-established principles of 
trust law by holding that a trustee’s conduct invites the inference that the 
trust  form was a “mere cover” for the conduct of business  “as before”.127 
Under  such  circumstances,  a court can consequently  hold that the trust 
form “is a veneer that in justice should be pierced in the interests of 
creditors”.128   In Van der Merwe129   the Court likewise indicated a clear link 
between the possibility of going behind the trust and the abuse of the trust 
form.130  The facts of that case, the Court said, established a “classic example 
of an abuse  of the trust  form” flowing directly from  the conduct of the 
trustees in question.131 
Although it is already very useful to know that the “abuse” of a trust could 
invite such drastic action from a court, it still remains too vague to be of 
much  practical assistance.  The  next  challenge would  be to  explain the 
concept of “abuse” in this situation, and also to provide some concrete 
guidelines which could be employed to test a trustee’s conduct in this regard. 
As the correct theoretical context cannot be the requirements for the creation 
of a valid trust,132   the explanation must lie elsewhere. The case analysis in 
the previous section, in my view, points strongly towards what may be called 
the “principles of trust administration”. In South African law, these principles 
have been formulated as follows:133   (1) the trustee is bound to exercise an 
independent discretion; (2) the trustee must give effect to the trust deed (or 
instrument), properly interpreted; and (3) the trustee must, in the 
performance of duties and the exercise of powers, act with care, diligence 
and skill. Instead of referring to these as “principles”, one may also call them 
the core “duties” of a trustee (as I will do in what follows). 
 
 
125    Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v. Parker (supra n. 113) para  37. 
126    Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v. Parker (supra n. 113) paras  37 1–37.3. 
127    Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v. Parker (supra n. 113) para  37.3. 
128    Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v. Parker (supra n. 113) para  37.3. 
129    Van der Merwe NO  and Others v. Hydraberg Hydraulics CC (supra n. 114) and see supra 
III. 2. 
130    Van der Merwe NO and Others v. Hydraberg Hydraulics CC (supra n. 114) para  38. See also 
First Rand Limited Trading as First National Bank v. Britz (supra n. 112) para  61. 
131    Van der Merwe NO and Others v. Hydraberg Hydraulics CC (supra n. 114) para  39. 
132    See supra II. 2. 
133    See Cameron/De Waal/Wunsh/Solomon/Kahn 262. 
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 My submission is that the analysis in the previous section illustrates that 
cases where the courts have considered, or in fact decided, to go behind the 
trust are indeed cases where the trustees have failed in one or more of these 
duties. Regarding the duty of independence, the practical administration of 
the trusts or the trusts deeds themselves in cases such as Badenhorst and Thorpe 
show how this independence can be compromised in at least one or more of 
the following ways:134  (1) a trustee with the right to dismiss co-trustees; (2) 
a trustee  having the right to appoint new trustees  in the place of those 
dismissed; (3) a trustee who cannot be removed at all; or (4) a trustee being 
subservient to a dominant co-trustee. Cases such as Parker and Van der Merwe, 
on the other hand, show clear non-compliance with the duties to give effect 
to the trust deed and to act with care, diligence and skill. In fact, in Parker, 
the Court went as far as to call the conduct of the trustees in this regard a 
“breach of trust”.135 
 
 
IV. The importance of the distinction between the “sham” 
and “abuse” issues 
 
It has been argued that sham situations on the one hand, and abuse 
situations on the other, are approached from different theoretical angles. In 
the case of a sham, the question is whether a valid trust has been created at 
all.136 Here, the emphasis falls on the requirements for the creation of a valid 
trust; specifically that the founder must have the intention to create a trust. 
In the case of an abuse situation, the premise is that there is a valid trust, but 
that there may exist a justification for going behind the trust, and ignoring 
the trust for a particular purpose.137 
However, the distinction between the two situations is not only important 
for theoretical clarity. It also has practical implications. The most important 
one – and the one to which I will briefly refer here – is that it is decisive for 
the application (or destination) of the trust assets. This, in turn, has 
implications for both the trust beneficiaries and third parties (such as a 
trustee’s spouse or private creditors). 
In South African law, the effect of a lack of intention to create a trust will 
depend on the circumstances of each case. For example, if the intention was 
to benefit the recipient, but not to create a trust, the supposed trust will be 
 
 
134    Note,  however, that this  lack of independence can manifest  itself also in numerous 
other guises  Examples include a founder retaining control over trustees or trust assets or the 
issuing of a so-called “letter of wishes” by a founder. 
135    Land and Agricultural Bank of South Africa v. Parker (supra n. 113) para  14. 
136    See supra II. 2. 
137    See supra III. 
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 disregarded and the recipient will take free from any burden.138   If the 
intention  was  to create something  other  than a trust  (such  as  agency, a 
partnership or a fideicommissum), the transaction will be interpreted in 
accordance with the intention of the parties.139  But for present purposes, the 
case of a simulation or a sham in the true sense of the word is the important 
one. In such an instance, no effect will be given to the transaction.140  One 
important implication of this in the trust context will be that the “founder” 
will remain owner of the “trust assets”. Consequently, neither the “trustee” 
nor the “beneficiaries” will acquire any rights with regard to these assets. 
And, of course, the same is true for the “trustee’s” spouse or private 
creditors. 
In English law, the effect of a trust being identified as a sham has been 
worked out more elaborately than in South African law. So, for example, are 
sham  trusts  often discussed in the context of the resulting  trust,141   which 
South African law does not recognise. However, it is interesting to note that, 
broadly speaking, the effect of a sham trust would be the same in the two 
systems. In English trust law language, Hudson describes this effect as being 
that “no  equitable interest  will be deemed to have been created in that 
property on the basis that no trust ever came into existence”.142   Mowbray 
and others put it more directly:143 
 
“The effect of a trust being held to be ineffective  as a sham is that third parties can 
treat the trust property as still belonging to the settlor or the settlor’s estate.” 
 
In  other  words,  also  in  English  law  neither  the  “trustee”  nor  the 
“beneficiaries” will acquire any rights with regard to these assets. 
However, matters are quite different in the abuse situation. Because here 
the premise is that a valid trust does exist, both the trustees and the 
beneficiaries will acquire rights with regard to the trust assets. This opens 
the door for the possibility that a court may go behind the trust and order 
the application of the trust assets for a particular purpose, or may order an 
alternative course  of action. What are the possibilities  for a court?  The 
 
 
138    Cameron/De Waal/Wunsh/Solomon/Kahn 137 and the cases cited there. 
139    Cameron/De  Waal/Wunsh/Solomon/Kahn  137. See also  Khabola  NO  v. Ralitabo  NO 
[2011] ZAFSHC 62 (unreported, accessible at <http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ 
ZAFSHC/2011/62.html>). 
140    This is trite law, for which no authority needs to be cited, but the sham cases discussed 
supra II. 1 all support this approach. E.g. in Hippo Quarries (Tvl.) (Pty.) (Ltd.) v. Eardley 1992 
(1) SA 867 (A) 877C-E the Court said the following with reference to a simulated cession: 
“Conversely, if their intention to cede is not genuine because the real purpose of the parties is 
something other than cession, their ostensible transaction will likewise be ineffectual.” 
141    See e.g. Hudson 488 ff. 
142    Hudson 490. 
143    Mowbray/Tucker/Le  Poidevin/Simpson/Brightwell  (supra  n. 64) 95.  See also  Conaglen 
(supra n. 61) 203; Moffat (supra n. 64) 245. 
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 answer obviously depends on the circumstances of each particular case, but 
by way of summary, and with reference to the analysis of the cases above,144 
the following are definite possibilities: (1) in the insolvency context, a court 
can order that trust assets should be made available for the satisfaction of a 
trustee’s  private creditors;  (2) in the matrimonial property law context, a 
court can order that trust assets should be counted as a trustee’s private assets 
for the purposes of a redistribution order at a divorce (thus making the trust 
assets available for the trustee’s spouse); (3) a court can hold a “delinquent” 
trustee personally liable for the performance of an obligation undertaken on 
behalf of the trust;145  or (4) a court can order that the trust be performed “as 
if the obligation had been properly incurred by the trustees  acting in the 
capacity that they purported to act”.146 
Any course of action which a court may choose will necessarily entail a 
careful weighing up of the interests of, on the one hand, the trust beneficiaries 
and, on the other hand, third parties (such as the trustee’s spouse or private 
creditors). This will often be a difficult exercise, which may require some or 
other compromise between the interests of these two groups. But it tends to 
confirm that the flexible approach followed by the South African courts – 
with the aim of reaching an “equitable” or a “ just” outcome in each particular 
case147  – has much to commend it. 
 
 
V. Concluding remarks 
 
In this contribution, I have drawn attention to a relatively new development 
in the South African law of trusts, namely that a court may, under certain 
circumstances, go behind a trust (or ignore the trust) in order to apply the 
trust assets for purposes such as the satisfaction of the trustee’s private 
creditors, or for redistribution in matrimonial property disputes. With 
reference to English trust law, I have attempted to indicate that this particular 
issue should be distinguished from that of the sham trust issue. This 
distinction is important not only for theoretical clarity, but also because it 
has practical implications for the application (or destination) of trust assets 
– which, in turn, may affect both trust beneficiaries and third parties. 
In the light of the growing interest in the development of a continental 
European trust law, the South African experience in this context may be of 
value. This is so because the South African trust is a typical example of what 
one may call a “civilian” trust. In such a trust, the concept of a separation 
between trust  assets  and a trustee’s  private assets  – or the existence  of a 
 
144    See supra III. 2. 
145    Van der Merwe NO and Others v. Hydraberg Hydraulics CC (supra n. 114) para  41. 
146    Van der Merwe NO and Others v. Hydraberg Hydraulics CC (supra n. 114) para  41. 
147    See infra V. 
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 segregated fund – is absolutely vital. This concept is also acknowledged in 
the European context in, for example, the Principles  of European Trust 
Law, the DCFR,  and in trusts and trust-like institutions in individual 
jurisdictions. 
One of the implications (perhaps the most important one) of the separation 
between trust and private assets is that trust assets should not be available for 
the satisfaction of a trustee’s private creditors, or for redistribution in 
matrimonial property disputes. Again, this is acknowledged in, for example, 
the Principles of European Trust Law and the DCFR. The fact that there is 
now a growing body of cases in South African trust law where this separation 
has been breached can therefore be of interest  to European trust  lawyers. 
There are, in particular, two important questions in this regard. First, under 
what circumstances can such a breach be justified? And, secondly, what may 
be the result of such a breach? In this contribution, I have suggested answers 
to both of these questions as far as South African law is concerned. These 
answers  are typical of the pragmatic nature of the development of South 
African trust  law.148   South African law does  not possess the sophisticated 
equitable remedies available to English and other common law jurisdictions. 
However, the solutions suggested by the South African courts in this context 
are nevertheless characterised by their flexibility, and have been typified as 
advancing “equity”149   – not in the technical English sense, but certainly in 
the sense that they can accomplish results which may be regarded  as “ just”.150 
Therefore, it is hopefully  not too presumptuous to think that these solutions 
may be helpful in the development of this area of a Continental European 
trust law. 
Reinhard  Zimmermann – in whose  honour  this  special edition of the 
journal has been published – has always been interested in the mixed legal 
systems. This is especially so regarding South Africa, a country with which 
he has such close personal links. What he finds particularly fascinating about 
these legal systems is the coming together of two of the world’s great legal 
traditions,  namely the  civil law and the  common  law. And it has  been 
remarked that the development of a proper continental European trust law 
could be the “crowning glory” of his own quest to bring these two traditions 
closer to each other.151  He should find it heartening that South African trust 
 
 
148    See e.g. the following remark by Joubert J. A. in Braun v. Blann and Botha NNO  1984 
(2) SA 850 (A) 859F: “Our Courts have evolved and are still in the process of evolving our 
own law of trusts by adapting the trust idea to the principles of our own law.” 
149    See e.g. Van der Merwe NO and Others v. Hydraberg Hydraulics CC (supra n. 114) para  21; 
First Rand Limited Trading as First National Bank v. Britz (supra n. 112) para  69. 
150    See Land and Agricultural Bank  of South  Africa v. Parker (supra n. 113) para  37.3 where 
Cameron J. A. mentioned the possibility  that the “veneer” of a trust  should  sometimes  “in 
justice” be “pierced” in the interests of creditors. 
151    See Marius J. de Waal, A European Law of Trusts?, in: European Private Law Beyond 
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 law – both regarding its broader structure and in the minutiae of the 
treatment of particular trust  problems  (such  as  the one addressed  in this 
contribution) – may play a role in this development. 
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